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WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
TRACY E. McGEE"

INTRODUCTION
The acknowledged purposes of any "survey" article are to set forth a concise
and objective compilation of the recent changes and developments in the field
and to suggest specific approaches towards, or constructions of, existing law.
With this goal in mind, the author would note that the last survey of New Mexico's
Workers' Compensation Law was published in 1984. Numerous and significant
decisions have since been handed down by our appellate courts. Compounding
the dilemma of a survey author is the New Mexico Legislature's passage of not
one, but two Workers' Compensation Acts.' These Acts effected sweeping procedural and substantive changes in a body of law that had not received any
significant or pervasive legislative attention since 1959.2

Although each of the recent Acts has potential application to cases pending
at the time of publication, 3 few if any claims prosecuted under these recent
revisions has matured to a stage of precedential value. As a practical matter, all
of the workers' compensation appellate decisions discussed herein originated
4
within the jurisdiction of the state courts and are subject to the 1978 Act and
the judicial constructions of that Act. For these reasons, this survey is devoted
5
primarily to significant changes created by judicial decision of the last few years.
*Associate, Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., Albuquerque, New Mexico. University of

Texas at Austin, B.A., summa cum laude, 1980; J.D. 1983.
1. 1986 N.M. Laws 525, Ch. 22 § 1-106 (compiled at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§52-1-1 to -69 (Cum. Supp.
1986)); 1987 N.M. Laws 1261, Ch. 235 §§1-54 (compiled at N.M. STAT ANN. 8852-1-1 to -70 (Repl.
Pamphlet 1987)).
The most significant procedural change in the new Acts is that they remove jurisdiction over compensation
claims from the state district courts and confer it upon a newly created Workers' Compensation Administration. N.M. CONST. art. III, § 1. The Administration has exclusive jurisdiction over all claims filed on
or after December i, 1986. 1986 N.M. Laws 525, 629. The district courts ostensibly retain continuing
jurisdiction over matters originally filed before them for the purpose of enforcing stipulations and judgments,
approving settlements, and entertaining motions to reduce, increase, or terminate benefits previously awarded
by court order or approval. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§52-1-33 and -56 (1978 & Supp. 1986).
2. See 1959 N.M. Laws 196 (effective date July I, 1959).
3. 1986 N.M. Laws 525, 629 (effective dates contained in §103 are July 1, 1986 and December 1,
1986); 1987 N.M. Laws 1261 (no effective date provision, therefore 90 days after date of adjournment or
June 19, 1987).
4. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§52-1-1 to -69 (1978 & Supp. 1986).
5. The practitioner is encouraged to refer to the New Mexico Digest for 1984 and 1985 appellate decisions,
and to a variety of resource materials that elaborate upon and suggest the likely import of the new Acts.
E.g., Allen, Ben M., Effect of Substantive Changes in New Mexico's Workmen's Compensation Law
Upon Strategy Decisions by Practitioners (outline of topic presented at New Mexico State Bar Convention,
Ruidoso, New Mexico, 1986); New Mexico Trial Lawyers' Association, Workers' Compensation (compilation of materials presented May 2, 1986). Rules and regulations goveming cases filed before the Workers'
Compensation Administration, together with mandatory pleadings forms, are available through the main
Administration offices in Albuquerque.
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A. Exclusivity of Provisions of Act
In most states where an injured worker's claim against his employer is governed by a legislative enactment, the workers' compensation statute includes a
provision that the worker's statutory remedy against the employer is exclusive. 6
These "exclusivity provisions" operate to bar a worker covered by the statute
from asserting any other type of claim against the employer, including those
otherwise available at common law.7
In Williams v. Amax Chemical Corp.,' the New Mexico Supreme Court reiterated the generally accepted rule that the statutory provisions of the Act are sui
generis and create exclusive rights, remedies and procedures which do not exist
under the common law.9 The Act therefore precludes a tort claim that a plaintiff
brought in state court alleging that she was discharged in retaliation for filing a
workmen's compensation claim.'°
Similarly, in Fields v. D&R Tank & Equipment Co.," the "exclusivity" rule
was interpreted to preclude a worker's tort action for negligent medical treatment
where such services were furnished by the employer. With its decisions in
Williams and Fields the court reaffirmed its prior constructions of the exclusivity
provisions by continuing to bar actions outside the Act for bad faith refusal to
pay benefits or for retaliatory discharge. ' The preclusion of a worker's tort claim
against his employer, where the Act applies, has never really been seriously
questioned. 3
B. Compensable Injuries
An employee's injury or death is compensable under the Act if it is proximately
caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment, unless
the injury was self-inflicted.' 4 "The difficulty is not in defining the test, but in
applying it."'"5 Several cases construing the compensability test have extended
coverage under the Act to injuries with no physical manifestation, and to those
which had previously been held to be independent of, or too remote from, the
employment relationship to be work-related. 6
6. See generally, 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, §§65.00 to 65.60 (1988).
The exclusivity provisions of the 1978 Act are found at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§52-1-6(D), -8and -9 (1978
& Supp. 1986).
7. Id.
8. 104 N.M. 293, 720 P.2d 1234 (1986).
9. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§52-1-6(D), -8,-9 (1978 & Supp. 1986).
10. 104 N.M. at 294, 720 P.2d at 1237; see Lucero v.Northrip Logging Co., 101 N.M. 420, 683 P.2d
1342 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 101N.M. 419, 683 P.2d 1341 (1984) (Act issui generis).
11. 103 N.M. 141, 703 P.2d 918 (Ct.App.), cert.
denied, 103 N.M. 62, 702 P.2d 1007 (1985).
12. See Dickson v. Mountain States
Mut. Cas. Co., 98 N.M. 479, 650 P.2d 1 (1982);
Security Ins.Co.
of Hartford v.Chapman, 88 N.M. 292, 540 P.2d 222 (1975); Gonzales v. U.S.F.& G. Co., 99 N.M. 432,
659 P.2d 318 (Ct. App. 1983); Bottijliso
v. Hutchison Fruit
Co., 96 N.M. 789, 635 P.2d 992 (Ct. App.
1981).
13. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Montoya, 91 N.M. 788, 581 P.2d 1283 (1978); Roseberry v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 70 N.M. 19,369 P.2d 403 (1962); Royal Indemn. Co. v. Southern Cal. Petroleum
Corp., 67 N.M. 137, 353 P.2d 358 (1960); City of Artesia v. Carter, 94 N.M. 311, 610 P.2d 198 (Ct.
App.), cert.
denied, 94 N.M. 628, 614 P.2d 545 (1980).
14. N.M. STAT. ANN. §52-1-9(C) (1978 & Supp. 1986).
15. Schober v. Mountain Bell Tel., 96 N.M. 376, 380, 630 P.2d 1231, 1235 (Ct. App. 1980).
16. See cases cited infra note 19.
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In Candelaria v. General Electric Co., 7 the court considered the plaintiff's
allegations that he suffered anxiety attacks causing chest pain and hyperventilation as a result of a personality clash with his supervisor.' 8 The plaintiff was
diagnosed as having anxiety and depression disorders and paranoid ideations. "
The court of appeals held that mental injury without physical manifestation is
compensable, where the psychological injury was caused by a stress arising out
of and in the course of employment, even if the stress was produced by a gradual
emotional stimulus rather than a sudden, anxiety producing, on-the-job event.2"
The court distinguished between "real" and "perceived" on-the-job stress, 2 and
held that because there was sufficient evidence that the workman had suffered
actual stress on the job it was unnecessary to decide whether the Act would
cover injuries resulting from perceived stress.22
The court in Lopez v. Smith's Management Corp.,23 cited Candelariaas dispositive in holding that a work-related or exacerbated condition of schizophrenia,
without attendant physical injury, was compensable.24 The plaintiff was required
to show only that the employment was a cause of his problems, since the Act
"does not require the exclusion of all other possible factors." ' Judge Bivins
dissented on the issue of causation, noting the somewhat uncertain testimony of
plaintiff's treating physician in support of his opinion that plaintiff failed, as a
matter of law, to show that his mental injury was more likely than not related
to his employment. 26
In Schell v. Buell ECD Co.,27 the court held that suicide by a workman was
compensable if it resulted from a work-connected injury.' Language in the Act
17. 105 N.M. 167, 730 P.2d 470 (Ct. App.), cert.
quashed, 105 N.M. I11,729 P.2d 1365 (1986).
18. Id. at 169-70, 730 P.2d at 472-73.
19. Id. at 170, 730 P.2d at 473.
20. 105 N.M. at 172, 730 P.2d at 475. Candelaria reflects a rather predictable extension of prior decisions
grappling with the compensability of psychological injuries. See Webb v. Hamilton, 78 N.M. 647, 436
P.2d 507 (1968); Ross v. Sayers Well Servicing Co., 76 N.M. 321, 414 P.2d 679 (1966); Schober v.
Mountain Bell Tel., 96 N.M. 376, 630 P.2d 1231 (Ct. App. 1980).
21. "Actual stress is that stress traceable to real working conditions; imagined stress exists when a
worker honestly perceives that some event, or events, occurred during the course of his employment to
cause injury when, in fact, no such event or events occurred." 105 N.M. at 175, 730 P.2d at 478.
22. Id. at 174-75, 730 P.2d at 477-78. The court also discussed the denial of post-judgment relief to
the defendants, who sought to reduce benefits after discovering that the plaintiff had returned to work. Id.
at 175-76, 730 P.2d at 478-79. The denial of defendants' request for a reduction was based on evidence
obtained in supplemental discovery that plaintiff's work was modified to accommodate his psychological
disability and the testimony of his physicians that his ability to do some type of work did not affect their
opinions that plaintiff remained psychologically impaired. Id.
23. 106 N.M. 416, 744 P.2d 544 (Ct. App. 1986), cert.
quashed, 106 N.M. 405, 744 P.2d 180 (1987).
24. Id. at 417, 744 P.2d at 545.
25. Id. at 418, 744 P.2d at 546.
26. Id. at 419-20, 744 P.2d at 547-48. In a case decided under the companion statute, the Occupational
Disease and Disablement Act, the court of appeals in Chadwick v. Public Serv. Co., 105 N.M. 272, 731
P.2d 968 (Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, 105 N.M. 290, 731 P.2d 1334 (1987), upheld the denial of benefits
to a plaintiff who, while working for defendant, developed a contact dermatitis which lessened after the
plaintiff left his job. Because the plaintiff could show only that his allergic reaction was connected to the
job site where the allergens were plentiful and airborne, the court held that he did not establish that his
condition was a result of his occupation itself: "Adopting the argument that conditions of a particular
workplace unrelated to the claimant's occupation may give rise to a compensable occupational disease
would in effect transform the law's protection into health insurance." Id. at 274, 731 P.2d at 970.
27. 102 N.M. 44, 690 P.2d 1038 (Ct. App. 1983), cert. quashed, 103 N.M. 798, 715 P.2d 71 (1984).
28. ld. at 49, 690 P.2d at 1043.
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precluding recovery for self-inflicted or intentional injuries' did not apply where
the intentional act was a direct result of or flowed from an accidental, workrelated injury.' Subsequently, the court of appeals held in Shadbolt v. Schneider,
Inc.,3 that work-related stress with physical manifestations was compensable.
The plaintiff's preexisting hypertension did not affect his right to recovery.32
The court has, however, imposed some limitations on compensable injuries,
especially with regard to the award of compensation for purely "psychic" injuries. In Kern v. Ideal Basic Indus.," the New Mexico Court of Appeals held
that plaintiff's mental breakdown sustained as a result of his termination from
employment was not a risk incidental to or encountered in the course and scope
of plaintiff's job and, as such, was not compensable.
C. Discovery Matters
Although the Act contemplates that the employer bears the expense of all
discovery conducted by the claimant, the employer is protected from excessive
or unnecessary discovery expenses by a provision requiring the trial judge to
predetermine that "good cause" exists for any discovery sought by either party.'
In Soliz v. Bright Star Enters.,33 the court established that the "good cause"
showing is a mandatory prerequisite to the plaintiff's recovery of discovery costs
from the defendant;36 "[e]xcept as authorized by statute, no allowance for expenses of a deposition may be made in workmen's compensation cases." 37 In a
similar vein, Smith v. City of Albuquerque38 held that the court will award costs
for the appearance of a witness at trial only if authorized under section 52-135(B) of the Act. 39
The court expanded its holding in Soliz in Chadwick v. Public Serv. Co.'
Although the trial court had entered a general discovery order, the plaintiff had
not previously established good cause specifically for the deposition of his own
treating physician." The trial court decided the case in favor of the defendant
and awarded the defendant the cost of plaintiff's physician's deposition for which
the defendant had paid.42 The court of appeals affirmed the award of costs to
the prevailing defendant.43 Absent the prerequisite good cause showing, the court
declined to effect a presumptive shift of the costs of litigation from employee
to employer."
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

N.M. STAT. ANN. §52-1-11 (1978).
102 N.M. at 49, 690 P.2d at 1043.
103 N.M. 544, 710 P.2d 738 (Ct. App.), rev'd in part, 103 N.M. 467, 709 P.2d 189 (1985).
Id. at 547, 710 P.2d at 741.
101 N.M. 801, 689 P.2d 1272 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 102 N.M. 7, 690 P.2d 450 (1984).
N.M. STAT. ANN. §52-1-34 (1978 & Supp. 1986).
104 N.M. 202, 718 P.2d 1350 (Ct. App.), cer. denied, 104 N.M. 191, 718 P.2d 701 (1986).
Id. at 203, 718 P.2d at 1351.
Id. at 204, 718 P.2d at 1352.
105 N.M. 125, 729 P.2d 1379 (Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 128, 729 P.2d at 1382.
105 N.M. 272, 731 P.2d 968 (Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, 105 N.M. 290, 731 P.2d 1334 (1987).
Id. at 276, 731 P.2d at 972.
Id.

Id.
Id.
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Sanchez v. NationalElec. Supply Co. 5 concerned the extent of the employer's
duty to provide a worker's attorney, prior to trial, with particular documents
generated in the course of discovery. The plaintiff complained on appeal of
defense counsel's failure to provide plaintiff's counsel with a copy of a report
generated by a physician who conducted an independent medical examination
of the plaintiff on the defendant's behalf. ' The existence of the report was
revealed at trial during the examination of another physician.47 Defendants indicated to the court that they had not provided the report to plaintiff's counsel
because defendants did not intend to call the independent medical doctor at
trial.4 In affirming the trial court's denial of benefits,"9 the court of appeals noted
several factors.' First, plaintiff had never requested a copy of the report. 5'
Second, the defense did not offer the report at trial and, therefore, it could not
be considered "surprise evidence." 52 Finally, plaintiff had ample opportunity,
through discovery, to ascertain the nature and results of the examination prior
to trial. 53 The court thus determined there was no harmful error in the trial judge's
refusal to grant a continuance to plaintiff, who had claimed prejudice in not
having the report prior to trial.M
D. Dependents
The court in Employers Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Winters55 observed that the surviving
spouse and children of the employee are coequal dependents.' In Garrison v.
Safeway Stores,57 the court clarified the intent of section 52-1-17(A), which
provides that some children of a decedent workman are presumed to have been
financially dependent upon him, while others must establish actual dependency.5"
Although it acknowledged that requiring a worker's survivor to demonstrate
actual dependency would be consistent with the Act's intended purposes,59 the
court nevertheless concluded that the legislature intended full-time college students under the age of twenty-three to be "deemed" dependent upon the decedent
worker. The worker's daughter, a full-time college student under twenty-three,
did not have to establish actual dependency to recover a portion of the death
benefits.'
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

105 N.M. 97, 728 P.2d 1366 (Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 98, 728 P.2d at 1367.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 100, 728 P.2d at 1369.
Id.at 99, 728 P.2d at 1368.
Id.
Id.

53. Id.
54. Id. at 100, 728 P.2d at 1369.
55. 101 N.M. 315, 681 P.2d 741 (Ct.App. 1984).
56. Id. at 319-20, 681 P.2d at 745-46.
57. 102 N.M. 179, 692 P.2d 1328 (Ct. App.), cert denied, 102 N.M. 225, 693 P.2d 591 (1984).
58. Id. at 180-81, 692 P.2d at 1329-30.
59. Id. at 181; 692 P.2d at 1330. Those purposes are "to help protect the recipient of the payments
against want and to avoid his becoming a public charge, [citation omitted] and to keep an injured workman
and his family minimally secure financially Icitation omitted]." Id.
60. Id.
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E. Computation of Average Weekly Wage
Despite the inclusion in the Act of a rather detailed and specific provision
setting forth the method for calculating a particular worker's average weekly
wage for the purpose of paying compensation benefits, 6' the courts again had
occasion during the survey period to interpret that provision in resolving disputes
over how, and at what point in time, the calculation should be made. The Varos
v. Union Oil Co.62 court reiterated the rule that the date of the injury producing
the disability is the proper basis for the calculation of plaintiff's compensation
rate, not the date that the worker's benefits were wrongfully terminated.
Duran v. Albuquerque Public Schools63 concerned how the court should calculate the average weekly wage of an educational aide whose seasonal employment with the school district was for forty weeks per year. On appeal, the aide
contended that the trial court erred by dividing her annual salary by a fifty-twoweek period, rather than the shorter term actually worked by the claimant.64 The
court of appeals affirmed the method that the trial court utilized to determine the
aide's average weekly wage, noting that the alternative method urged by the
claimant would be "fundamentally unfair" to the employer because it would
result in a weekly compensation rate greater than the claimant's weekly salary
prior to becoming disabled.65
Finally, Romero v. General Elec. Corp.6 held that the appropriate compensation rate would be that which was in effect on the date when the worker knew
or should have known of his disability, not the rate in effect at the time of his
initial injury. The appellate court based its holding primarily on the trial court's
finding that the worker had returned to his employment approximately eight
months after his initial injury and worked for about two years before he was
aware that his injury, or the aggravation thereof, was disabling. 67
F. Creditfor Overpayments
Carter v. Mountain Bell" appears mainly to have been an effort to encourage
voluntary payment of benefits by employers and to discourage double recovery
by the worker under certain circumstances. The Cartercourt held that the worker's compensation insurance carrier was entitled to an offset or credit to the
extent that the employer paid benefits as a result of the employee's accidental
injury when those benefits were "of the same general character" '69 as the worker's
compensation benefits.7' The carefully worded decision in Carter turned largely
upon a finding that the benefits received by the plaintiff under both the company
61. N.M. STAT. ANN. §52-1-20(A)-(D) (1978 & Supp. 1986).
62. 101 N.M. 713, 688 P.2d 31 (Ct. App. 1984).
63. 105 N.M. 297, 731 P.2d 1341 (Ct. App. 1986), cert.
denied, 105 N.M. 290, 731 P.2d 1334 (1987).
64. Id. at298-99, 731 P.2d at 1342-43.
65. Id. at300, 731 P.2d at 1344.
66. 104 N.M. 652, 725 P.2d 1220 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 104 N.M. 632, 725 P.2d 832 (1986).
67. Id. at 658-59, 725 P.2d at 1226-27. See also Amos v. Gilbert western Corp., 103 N.M. 631, 711
P.2d 908 (Ct. App. 1985).
68. 105 N.M. 17, 727 P.2d 956 (Ct. App. 1986).
69. Id. at 21, 727 P.2d at 960.
70. Id.
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accident and health plan and the Act were intended to compensate her for the
same, single injury.7 Noting that principles of fundamental fairness should guide
its decision where the Act was silent, the court cited the incentive to the employer
to institute benefits more quickly with the promise of a credit.7 2 "[Tihe abhorrence
of the notion that a worker should get more money for being disabled than for
working" also seems to have influenced the Carter court. 7' Employers with
private insurance plans, or who are self-insured, can be expected, after Carter,
to insist that a worker injured on the job may not collect both private and statutory
benefits without some credit or offset.
G. Statute of Limitations
In Romero v. GeneralElec. Corp., the court held that the statute of limitations
that applies to the Act does not begin to run until his disability is apparent to
the worker. 7' The Romero court noted that there was substantial evidence that,
because the plaintiff had returned to work and could fully perform his duties,
he was unaware of his disability, even though he visited the doctor during that
period.7 6 The court reaffirmed the "reasonably apparent" rule which governs
when a plaintiff knows or should have known of his disabling injury.77 Under
that rule, a workman who can only return to work with pain, or whose physician
limits his activities, or whose job duties must be modified or restricted, will
probably be charged with knowledge of his disability. 78 If the disability has been
apparent for a period longer than that allowed for the filing of a claim, the
worker's claim will be subject to the tolling provisions of the Act.79
Similarly, in Zengerle v. City of Socorro,80 the plaintiff had a slow, progressive
ulcer condition about which she was aware for several years before filing her
compensation action." The court determined, however, that the plaintiff never
suffered any partial disability, and only ceased work when it became impossible
to continue in her position.8 2 Thus, the court held that the statute of limitations
did not begin to run until plaintiff became totally disabled.83
H. Causation
Under the Niederstadt" rule, a doctor's testimony is insufficient to show
causation as required under section 52-1-28 of the Act where a physician lacks
71. Id. at 21-22, 727 P.2d at 960-61.
72. Id. at 23, 727 P.2d at 962.
73. Id.
74. 104 N.M. 652, 725 P.2d 1220 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 104 N.M. 632, 725 P.2d 832 (1986).
75. Id. at 658-59, 725 P.2d at 1226-27.
76. Id. at 658, 725 P.2d at 1226.
77. Id. at 656, 657, 725 P.2d at 1224, 1225.
78. Id. at 657-58, 725 P.2d 1225-26.
79. Id. and cases cited therein.
80. 105 N.M. 797, 737 P.2d 1174 (Ct. App. 1986), cert. quashed, 105 N.M. 781, 737 P.2d 893 (1987).
81. ld. at 799, 737 P.2d at 1176.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 802, 737 P.2d at 1179.
84. Niederstadt v. Ancho Rico Consol. Mines, 88 N.M. 48, 536 P.2d 1104 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
88 N.M. 29, 536 P.2d 1085 (1975).
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5
knowledge of pertinent information regarding the patient's injuries." In Mendez
6
v. Southwest Community Health Servs., the court limited the rule by holding
of a medical expert
that it applies only when "there is uncontradicted testimony
87
that the information on prior injuries is pertinent."
In Graham v. PresbyterianHosp. Center,"" the court of appeals held that the
"uncontroverted medical testimony" rule 9 would not apply to a determination
9
of a worker's entitlement to payment of her past medical expenses. ' The plaintiff
had
undertaken
sought payment by the employer for diagnostic tests her doctors
9
offered no
the
employer
though
Even
pain.
of
representations
on
her
based
contradictory medical testimony, the trial court found that the tests were not
reasonable or necessary because the plaintiff had been dishonest with her physicians." The appellate court acknowledged the plaintiff's substantive right to
payment of reasonable and necessary medical expenses once she demonstrated
a compensable injury.93 Nevertheless, the court affirmed the denial of recovery
by the plaintiff, noting that substantial evidence supported the conclusion that
she had not been candid with her doctors. 94
In Clavery v. Zia Co.," the court held that it is improper to consider postinjury, non-work-related conditions-here, breast cancer in the plaintiff'- in
determining the extent of disability, 97 even though the cancer admittedly was
part of the plaintiff's general physical capacity.9 A plaintiff must establish the
causal connection between the disability and the work-related injury and should
recover only to the extent that the work-related injury disables her from performing her duties.9
85. Id. at 51, 536 P.2d at 1107.
86. 104 N.M. 608, 725 P.2d 584 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 104 N.M. 632, 725 P.2d 832 (1986).
87. 104 N.M. at 612, 725 P.2d at 588.
88. 104 N.M. 490, 723 P.2d 259 (Ct. App. 1986).
89. As set out in Hemandez v. Mead Foods, Inc., 104 N.M. 67, 716 P.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1986), the
rule is "an exception to the general rule that a trial court can accept or reject expert opinion as it sees fit."
Id. at 70, 716 P.2d at 648 (citation omitted). The exception, which only applies to expert medical testimony
on the issue of a causal connection between an accident and a disability, makes uncontradicted medical
testimony binding upon the trier of fact. Id. at 70-71, 716 P.2d at 648-49.
90. 104 N.M. at 492, 723 P.2d at 261.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 491, 723 P.2d at 260.
94. Id. at 492, 723 P.2d at 261.
95. 104 N.M. 321, 720 P.2d 1262 (Ct. App. 1986).
96. Id. at 322-23, 720 P.2d at 1263-64.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. Where a preexisting disease or condition exacerbates or creates a disability where the workrelated injury itself would not otherwise have been disabling, the injury is nevertheless compensable.
Sanchez v. Homestake Mining Co., 102 N.M. 473, 697 P.2d 156 (Ct. App. 1985). On the other hand,
the court of appeals has declined to consider general health and other problems unrelated to a worker's
industrial injury in determining his extent of disability, even though the combination of these factors rendered
him unemployable as a practical matter. Dodrill v. Albuquerque Utils. Corp., 103 N.M. 737, 713 P.2d 7
(Ct. App. 1985). Dodrill, however, turned primarily on the fact that the worker was still employed, such
that his claim for total disability was premature. 103 N.M. at 738, 713 P.2d at 8. This leaves open the
possibility that the theory for total disability urged by the plaintiff in Dodrill, commonly referred to as the
"odd-lot doctrine," might be adopted and applied by a New Mexico court under the appropriate circumstances.

Winter 1988]

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

LAW

In Grudzina v. New Mexico Youth Diagnostic & Dev. Center,," the plaintiff
blamed his seizure disorder on his work, but continued to represent to a third
party'"' that he was seizure-free, during the same period for which he was seeking
benefits. 2 The court held that the " uncontroverted medical testimony rule,"' 3
originally announced in Ross v. Sayers Well Servicing Co., Inc.,'" applied only
to the issue of causation, and not to the issue of disability.' 05 Here, because the
trial court had ruled against the plaintiff on the issue of disability, plaintiff's
medical testimony to the contrary, whether or not controverted, was not dispositive. "
The court of appeals noted in Archuleta v. Safeway Stores, Inc. " that section
52-1-28 of the Act, which requires plaintiff to demonstrate with expert medical
testimony a causal connection between his industrial accident and his resulting
disability, does not require that the disability be demonstrated to a reasonable
medical certainty."' This is consistent with the court's refusal in Candelaria v.
GeneralElec. Co. '" to impose a burden on plaintiff to exclude all possible causal
factors for his illness, other than those related to his work, in order to obtain
benefits.
I. Diminution or Termination of Benefits"°
Holliday v. Talk of the Town, Inc."' considered an employer's obligation to
pay disability benefits to a worker's beneficiary after his death. The worker died
of causes unrelated to his compensable injury before the trial court had ruled on
his petition for an increase in previously awarded scheduled injury benefits." 2
Relying on sections 52-1-56(A) and (B),"' the court concluded that the worker's
beneficiary was entitled to pursue a claim for disability benefits to which the
worker may have been entitled up to the time of his death.'
100. 104 N.M. 576, 725 P.2d 255 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 104 N.M. 460, 722 P.2d 1182 (1986).
101. The Federal Aviation Administration, to whom he was applying for recertification as a pilot.
102. 104 N.M. at 579-80, 725 P.2d at 258-59.
103. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. The practitioner cannot be reminded too often that a
substantial evidence standard, and not the uncontroverted medical evidence rule, applies to all issues in a
compensati on claim, save the issue of causation. See Graham v. Presbyterian Hosp. Center, 104 N.M.
490, 723 P.2d 259 (Ct. App. 1986); Hernandez v. Mead Foods, Inc., 104 N.M. 67, 716 P.2d 645 (Ct.
App. 1986).
104. 76 N.M. 321, 414 P.2d 679 (1966).
105. 104 N.M. at 581-83, 725 P.2d at 260-62.
106. Id. at 582, 725 P.2d at 261.
107. 104 N.M. 769, 727 P.2d at 77 (Ct. App. 1986).
108. Id. at 771, 727 P.2d at 79.
109. 105 N.M. 167, 730 P.2d 470 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 105 N.M. I I, 729 P.2d 1365 (1986).
110. Different provisions of the Act allow for a reduction or termination of benefits -under a variety of
circumstances. See, e.g., §52-1-56(C) (permitting cessation of benefits upon recovery against or settlement
with third-party tortfeasor by worker or his survivors), §52-1-51(G) (termination of benefits for refusal to
submit to physical exam or desist injurious or unsanitary practices).
III. 102 N.M. 540, 697 P.2d 959 (Ct. App. 1985).
112. Id. at 541-42, 697 P.2d at 960-61.
113. (1978 & Supp. 1986).
114. 102 N.M. at 542, 697 P.2d at 961. The employer sought affirmance of its summary judgment on
the additional grounds that a release executed by plaintiff prior to his seeking an increase in benefits barred
the additional claims. The court rejected the arguments of both parties on this issue, concluding independently
that the language of the release itself governed. The release unambiguously included all further claims of
plaintiff resulting from his work-related injury. 102 N.M. at 542-43, 697 P.2d at 961-62.
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In Bower v. Western Fleet Maintenance," 5 the court of appeals initially reversed the trial judge's order denying the employer's request for a diminution
of benefits for a paraplegic who had returned to work." 6 On remand, the trial
court determined that the plaintiff was ninety-nine percent disabled;" 7 the court
of appeals affirmed." 8 It appears that the court of appeals analyzed the issue as
a substantial evidence question.' 9 The Bower court's decision is significant
because the court reaffirmed the very broad discretion a trial judge enjoys in
weighing the evidence to determine the presence or percentage extent of a disability. 120
In Sandoval v. United Nuclear Corp., 121 the court of appeals expanded on its
prior unreported opinion which had determined that suspected heroin trafficking,
for which the plaintiff had been indicted, did not constitute "other work" under
section 52-1-56. 22 This section requires the defendant to show that the plaintiff
was capable of doing "other work" before benefits can be terminated or reduced.' 23 The court also refused to diminish or terminate benefits being paid to
plaintiff, a fugitive from justice, as a sanction for his refusal to appear for his
deposition. 124
J. Requirement of Expert Testimony Under Section 52-1-28
In Medina v. OriginalHamburgerStand," the court of appeals attempted to
clarify the basis for its earlier opinion in Fierro v. Stanley's Hardware, 26 in
which it had rejected testimony offered by the plaintiff's psychologist as inadequate to establish a causal connection between an accident and a disability
because a psychologist's testimony was not expert medical testimony as required
by section 52-1-28.127 The Fierro opinion had compared statutory provisions
separate from the Act to construe section 52-1-28 to require the testimony of a
licensed medical doctor.' 28 Medina elaborated and refined its interpretation of
the independent statutes to distinguish between psychologists and osteopathic
physicians, holding that the latter professionals met the requirements of section
52-1-28. 129
In a subsequent decision in which it neither cited nor discussed Medina, the
supreme court in Madrid v. University of California'3 ° embarked on a less tech115. 104 N.M. 731, 726 P.2d 885 (Ct. App. 1986).
116. Id. at 732, 726 P.2d at 886.
117. id. at 735, 726 P.2d at 889.
118. Id. at 737, 726 P.2d at 891.
119. Id. at 735-37, 726 P.2d at 889-91.
120. See, id., discussion and cases cited at 736-37, 726 P.2d at 890-91.
121.105 N.M. 105,729 P.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1986).
122. id. at 106, 726 P.2d at 504.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 108-10, 729 P.2d 506-08.
125. 105 N.M. 78, 728 P.2d 488 (Ct. App. 1986).
126. 104 N.M. 401, 722 P.2d 652 (Ct.App. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 104 N.M. 50, 716 P.2d
241 (1986).
127. (1978 & Supp. 1986).
128. 104 N.M. at 409-10, 722 P.2d at 660-61.
129. 105 N.M. at 80, 728 P.2d at 490.
130. 105 N.M. 715, 737 P.2d 74 (1987).
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nical and far more general construction of pertinent legislation governing health
care providers. Writing for the majority, Justice Walters held that there was no
evidence of legislative intent in the Act or elsewhere to restrict the expert testimony required by section 52-1-28 to only those witnesses who are licensed
physicians. 3' Madrid effectively overruled Fierro by approving the testimony
of a psychologist offered by the worker at trial to establish
a causal connection
32
between her disability and her work-related injury.
K. Subsequent Injury Fund'33
Fierrov. Stanley's Hardware"3 began its sojourn through appellate courts as
a challenge by the Fund to the trial court's determination that the Fund was
liable for a portion of the worker's compensable eye injury.' The trial court
determined the employer had actual knowledge" 36 of the employee's preexisting
eye condition, and that the employee's filing of a certificate of preexisting impairment, after the job injury but before an action was commenced against the
Fund, was timely. 13 The court of appeals reversed on both issues, holding that
the evidence did not show that the employer had actual knowledge of the plaintiff's pre-existing eye impairment and that the language of section 52-2-6 required
that, to be effective, the certificate of pre-existing impairment had to be filed
before the employee suffered a second injury.' 38 Because the court's reversal of
the trial court on these issues meant the Fund was not liable, the court did not
reach the third issue the Fund raised regarding whether the limitations on liability
contained in the "scheduled injury" provisions of the Act'39 covered the plaintiff's
injury or allowed recovery against the Fund."
In Fierro II, " the supreme court reversed the court of appeals. The court
noted that the employer had sufficient actual knowledge of the pre-existing
condition. 41 2 The court then cited language in the Act which it construed to allow
an employee to file a certificate of pre-existing impairment after an injury."'
131. Id. at 718, 737 P.2d at 77.
132. Id.
133. The New Mexico Subsequent Injury Fund (hereinafter, "the Fund") is established, described, and
defined at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§52-2-1 to -13 (1978 & Supp. 1986). Funded by mandatory insurance
companies and self-insured employers covered by the Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §52-2-4 (1978 & Supp.
1986), the Fund was established to create an incentive to employers to hire workers whose preexisting
impairments might otherwise render them undesirable employees because of their ostensible increased risk
of reinjury. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§52-2-2(A)-(C) (1978 & Supp. 1986). Arguably, the Fund also operates
to encourage the employee's full disclosure of any preexisting injury at the time of hire. The cases decided
in this survey period demonstrate the judicial interest in fostering both legislative goals.
134. 104 N.M. 401, 722 P.2d 652 (Ct. App. 1985) (Fierro I), reversed and remanded, 104 N.M. 50,
716 P.2d 241 (1986) (Fierro II), after remand, 104 N.M. 411, 722 P.2d 662 (Ct. App. 1986) (Fierro i11).
135. 104 N.M. at 402-03, 722 P.2d at 653-54.
136. Id. at 403, 722 P.2d at 654.
137. Id.
138. Id.at 408, 722 P.2d at 659.
139. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§52-1-43(A)-(D).
140. 104 N.M. at 402, 722 P.2d at 653.
141. 104 N.M. 50, 716 P.2d 241 (1986).
142. Id. at 51, 716 P.2d at 242.
143. Id. at 53, 716 P.2d at 244.
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Finally, the court remanded the case for a determination of the schedule of injury
issues. "
On remand, the court of appeals devoted its opinion in Fierro Ii1"1 to the
questions of how section 52-1-43 would operate in an action against the Fund
and with respect to a congenital defect, 44 and to a determination of whether the
47
trial court's disability determination and apportionment of liability was proper.'
The court cited its prior construction of the "scheduled injury" provisions of the
Act in Vaughn v. United Nuclear Corp. 48 in support of its strongly worded
holding that congenital defects were clearly covered under those provisions, and
were actionable against the Fund despite an apparent conflict in the statutes.49
In Smith v. Trailways, Inc., "othe court held that because the employer was
the party whose financial position stood to be improved by a contribution from
5
the Fund, it had the duty of proving apportionment between itself and the Fund. '
The court also observed that principles of "fundamental fairness" would affect
the distribution of the reimbursement.' 52 The lower court held that the Fund's
liability to the employer was defined as the difference between the compensation
payable for the second injury independent of the preexisting impairment and the
compensation payable for the impairment resulting from the combined injuries. "'
The Subsequent Injury Fund would not be liable to the employer where (a) the
claimant's disability was found not to be compensable at all, or (b) the second
or subsequent injury was so severe that it alone could have caused the entire
disability in the absence of a preexisting impairment. "
In Superintendent of Ins. v. Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co., ' the court
of appeals precluded an award of attorneys' fees from the Fund directly to an
employer's insurance carrier. " The trial court had made the award after entering
a declaratory judgment that the Fund was liable for a portion of the compensation
benefits charged to the employer.' In reversing the trial court, the court of
144. Id.
145. 104 N.M. 411, 722 P.2d 662 (Ct. App. 1986).
146. The plaintiff's preexisting impairment in this case was a congenital defect in one eye which
substantially increased the visual impairment resulting from a work-related injury to the remaining eye.
147. 104 N.M. at 413, 722 P.2d at 664.
148. 98 N.M. 481, 650 P.2d 3 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, Jasso v. Vaughn, 98 N.M. 478, 649 P.2d
1391 (1982). The court seized upon language in Vaughn articulating the broad purpose of the Fund to
protect the handicapped worker's place in industry, 98 N.M. at 486-87, 650 P.2d at 8-9, finding no reason
to exclude congenital defects from those protections. 104 N.M. at 413-14, 722 P.2d at 664-65.
149. Id. The conflicting provisions construed by the court are found at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§52-2-2(A)
and -6, and 52-2-3 and -9(A).
150. 103 N.M. 741, 713 P.2d 557 (Ct. App. 1986).
151. Id. at 745, 713 P.2d at 561. "Once the worker has established his right to recovery, it makes little
difference to him how he is paid." Id. But see Romero v. Cotton Butane Co., Inc., 105 N.M. 73, 78, 728
P.2d 483, 488 (Ct. App. 1986) (the party seeking recovery, whether the worker or the employer, bears the
burden of establishing apportionment of Fund's liability). See also Duran v. Xerox Corp., 105 N.M. 277,
282, 731 P.2d 973, 978 (Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, Jasso v. Duran, 105 N.M. 290, 731 P.2d 1334
(1987) (the Fund is a custodian or trustee of proceeds to which either the worker or the employer may be
entitled).
152. 103 N.M. at 745, 713 P.2d at 561.
153. Id. at 746-48, 713 P.2d at 562-64.
154. Id.
155. 104 N.M. 605, 725 P.2d 581 (Ct. App. 1986).
156. Id. at 608, 725 P.2d at 584.
157. Id. at 606, 725 P.2d at 582.
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appeals held that an insurance company is not a "claimant" under section 521-54(C). 15
Thereafter, considering yet another issue concerning the Fund for the first
time, the New Mexico Court of Appeals held in Romero v. Cotton Butane Co.' 59
that a worker who sues both his employer and the Fund and then settles his
action with the employer has a direct, and not simply a derivative right through
the employer, to recover against the Fund. " This decision was initially puzzling
to those who had always construed the Fund to exist for the benefit of employers
who had "paid too much," but the decision should not preclude the efficient and
equitable apportionment of Fund proceeds.' 6
L. Course and Scope of Employment
The Act contemplates payment of compensation to a worker only for injuries
he sustains in the course and scope of his employment.' 62 This limitation has
been tested and defined in a number of ways in recent decisions.
For example, the court of appeals held in Barton v. Las Cosita'63 that an injury
"arises" in the course and scope of a worker's employment if it results from a
risk to which the employment subjected him.t "t Similarly, in Smith v. City of
Albuquerque,'65 the court held that a claimant had a right to benefits for serious
injuries she sustained in a fall over a carpet strip at a private restaurant where
she was attending a business luncheon.'66 The court awarded benefits, noting
that the plaintiff had her employer's permission to attend the lunch, was furthering
her employer's interests in so doing, and was thus acting within the course and
scope of her employment when injured. 67
Effecting by far the most significant departure to date from the traditional
notion that injuries occurring outside of business hours are not in the course of
and scope of employment, the supreme court in Dupper v. Liberty Mutual Ins.
Co. "r overruled a long line of New Mexico cases' 69 and adopted the "premisesline" liability rule. 70 In so doing, the court rejected prior interpretations of the
158. Id. at 608, 725 P.2d at 584.
159. 105 N.M. 73, 728 P.2d 483 (Ct. App. 1986).
160. Id. at 77-78, 728 P.2d 487-88.
161. See cases cited supra note 151, which clarify that the Fund exists for the benefit of the worker as
well as for the employer.
162. N.M. STAT. ANN. §52-1-19 (1978 & Supp. 1986).
163. 102 N.M. 312,694 P.2d 1377 (Ct. App. 1984), cert denied, 102 N.M. 293,694 P.2d 1358 (1985).
164. Id. at 315, 694 P.2d at 1380.
165. 105 N.M. 125, 729 P.2d 1379 (Ct. App. 1986).
166. Id. at 130, 729 P.2d at 1384.
167. Id. at 129-30, 729 P.2d at 1383-84.
168. 105 N.M. 503, 734 P.2d 743 (1987).
169. id. at 507, 734 P.2d at 747. See also Trembath v. Riggs, 100 N.M. 615, 673 P.2d 1348 (Ct. App.
1983), cert denied, 101 N.M. 11, 677 P.2d 624 (1984); Gonzales v. New Mexico State Highway Dept.,
97 N.M. 98, 637 P.2d 48 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 97 N.M. 621, 642 P.2d 607 (1981); Romero v. S.S.
Kresge Co., 95 N.M. 484, 623 P.2d 998 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 95 N.M. 593, 624 P.2d 535 (1981);
Hayes v. Ampex Corp., 85 N.M. 444, 512 P.2d 1280 (Ct. App. 1973).
170. 105 N.M. at 504, 506, 739 P.2d at 744, 746. The "premises-line" rule "allows compensation for
'injuries occurring on the premises while [employees having fixed hours and place of workl are going to
and from work before or after working hours or at lunchtime."' Id. (citing I A. LARSON, THE LAW OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 15.00 (1985).
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"going and coming rule,"' 71 which had precluded a worker from recovering for
injuries that had occurred before the worker had punched in or after he had
clocked out for the day even if his injuries had occurred on the employer's
premises, unless the worker could show that his injuries were the result of his
employer's negligence.' 72 Under Dupper's interpretation of section 52-1-19, the
"time clock" rationale has no bearing upon compensability; accidental injuries
occurring on the employer's premises, whether the worker has assumed or left
his duties of employment, and whether the result of the employer's negligence,
henceforth will be deemed to have occurred in the course and scope of employment and thus will be compensable.' 73
M. Scheduled Injuries Section'74
The court in Carterv. Mountain Bell' declined to hold that a shoulder injury
would, in all cases, fall outside the purview of the scheduled injuries section.' 76
Instead, the court remanded the case for clarification of the trial court's inconsistent findings, some of which supported the conclusion that the plaintiff had
suffered a scheduled injury while others supported an award of disability benefits
for an unscheduled injury. " However, the court cited Hamilton v. Doty,' a
shoulder injury case, and was thus at least hinting that a shoulder injury probably
should be analyzed as a nonscheduled injury.' 79
In Archuleta v. Safeway Stores, Inc., s"the employer urged the court of appeals
to reconsider its holding in Witcher v. Capitan Drilling Co., '' which, for the
first time, construed the scheduled injury provision to allow an award of total
disability to a worker who had sustained only a scheduled injury. The court of
appeals declined to elaborate upon, modify, or reaffirm its opinion in Witcher.' 2
Instead, it noted that the supreme court had adopted the Witcher holding in
171. Dupper, 105 N.M. 503, 507, 734 P.2d 743, 747. See also cases cited supra note 169. This rule
arose from prior judicial interpretation of N.M. STAT. ANN. §52-1-19 (1978 & Supp. 1986).
172. See cases cited supra note 169.
173. 105 N.M. 506-07, 734 P.2d 746-47. Notably, the court remedied the perceived unfairness of the
temporal constraints previously imposed upon an injured worker while continuing to require that the worker's
injury occur on his employer's premises unless it was otherwise work-related. Id.
174. Scheduled injuries--those which affect enumerated portions of the body and result in a physical
impairment-and the benefits awarded therefor under the Act, are defined and set forth in N.M. STAT.
ANN. §52-1-43 (1978 & Supp. 1986).
175. 105 N.M. 17, 727 P.2d 956 (Ct. App. 1986).
176. Id. at 25, 727 P.2d at 964.
177. Id.
178. 71 N.M. 422, 379 P.2d 69 (1962).
179. Carter. 105 N.M. at 25, 727 P.2d at 964. The scheduled injury provisions define the locus of a
" N.M. STAT. ANN. §52-1covered injury in very broad terms, i.e., "one arm at or near shoulder ...
43A(l) (Supp. 1986); "one leg at or above the knee .... " N.M. STAT. ANN. §52-1-43A(30) (Supp.
1986). This may explain the confusion attending injuries which affect portions of the anatomy proximate
to, but not clearly related to, the larger limb or structure with which they are associated. An injury to the
kneecap is on the schedule, Maschio v. Kaiser Steel, 100 N.M. 455, 672 P.2d 284 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
100 N.M. 439, 671 P.2d 1150 (1983); a reflex sympathetic dystrophy in the shoulder is probably a nonscheduled injury, Carter, 105 N.M. 17, 727 P.2d 956.
180. 104 N.M. 769, 727 P.2d 77 (Ct. App. 1986).
181. 84 N.M. 369, 503 P.2d 652 (Ct. App. 1972).
182. 104 N.M. at 772, 727 P.2d at 80.
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American Tank and Steel Corp. v. Thompson 8 3 and concluded that it was bound
by that supreme court precedent. "
N. Vocational Rehabilitation Benefits'85
Nichols v. Teledyne Economic Dev. Co.'86 clarified that the plaintiff must
demonstrate that an award of vocational rehabilitation expenses is necessary to
return him to comparable employment before the court will award such benefits.
The plaintiff's burden to demonstrate the need for additional training before he
can return to work was reiterated in Hernandez v. Mead Foods, Inc.,'87 where
the court refused rehabilitation benefits to a worker who had been able to return
to his former job without further training after his injury. 88
'
Finally, in Garcia v. Schneider, Inc., 89
' the court construed section 5 2 -1-50" °
of the Act to impose no dollar limitation on plaintiff's recovery of vocational
rehabilitation benefits; such benefits should be awarded to the extent that they
are "reasonable."' 9'
0. Attorneys' Fees
The award against the employer of fees to the claimant's attorney is generally
based upon the amount of claimant's recovery, if any, and a number of other
factors which vary from case to case.' 9 Although the New Mexico appellate
courts have previously offered substantial guidance to the trial courts charged
with determining a reasonable award of fees, 93 they addressed several novel
issues in this area during the survey period.
The supreme court noted in Board of Educ. v. Quintana"9 that attorneys' fees
should not be awarded based on the amount of future medical expenses awarded
to the plaintiff. "' The value of medical care to which the plaintiff might be
entitled is far too speculative to serve as a basis for the award of a specific fee. '9
183. 90 N.M. 513, 565 P.2d 1030 (1977).
184. 104 N.M. at 772, 727 P.2d at 80.
185. The statute provides in part for an award of vocational rehabilitation benefits to a worker whose
disability-resulting compensable injury precludes his return, as of the time of trial, to any employment for
which he is generally suited without further training or education. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §52-1-50 (1978
& Supp. 1986).
186. 103 N.M. 393, 707 P.2d 1203 (Ct. App. 1985).
187. 104 N.M. 67, 716 P.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1986).
188. Id. at 73, 716 P.2d at 651.
189. 105 N.M. 234, 731 P.2d 377 (Ct. App. 1986).
190. (1978 & Supp. 1986).
191. 105 N.M. at 238, 731 P.2d 381.
192. See, e.g., Fryar v. Johnson, 93 N.M. 485, 487, 601 P.2d 718, 720 (1979) (some of the factors
generally considered are complexity of claim, time and effort expended, nature and amount of recovery
obtained for claimant, skill and reputation of attorney seeking fees).
193. E.g., id.; Gearhart v. Edison Metal Products, 92 N.M. 763, 765, 595 P.2d 401, 403 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 92 N.M. 621, 593 P.2d 62 (1979). Waymire v. Signal Oil Field Service, Inc., 77 N.M. 297,
302, 422 P.2d 34, 39 (1966).
194. 102 N.M. 433, 697 P.2d 116 (1985).
195. Id. at 435, 697 P.2d at 118.
196. Id.Two examples of how future medical expenses might be uncertain would be I) when a claimant's
condition resolved so that future care became altogether unnecessary, or 2) when the trial judge later
determined that the type of medical care sought by claimant post-judgment was no longer reasonable.
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Similarly, in Davis v. Homestake Mining Co., 97
' the court of appeals prohibited
the award of attorneys' fees based on speculative elements. Applying reasoning
consistent with the analysis in Quintana, the court determined that an attorneys'
fee award should be based upon the present value of the claimant's award as of
the time the legal services were rendered. 9 ' Benefits to be paid in the future
which are subject to collateral or subsequent events that may diminish or increase
their value should not factor into the attorney's compensation."
In Archuleta v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 2" the court of appeals held that a reasonable attorney fee, no matter how it is determined, may be awarded only for
one attorney's representation of the claimant, even though the Act does not
appear to preclude representation by more than one attorney. 2"' The court ordered
a remittitur of the $24,727.50 fee awarded to plaintiff's two attorneys, to $12,500.00
plus tax, because the case involved a single issue of normal complexity which
should have been tried in one to one-and-one-half days rather than three days.2 2
Bower v. Western Fleet Maintenance" upheld an award of attorneys' fees to
plaintiff's counsel for his representation of the claimant in a proceeding where
the employer sought a reduction of the plaintiff's award of total and permanent
disability benefits. 2' The attorney was compensated for his representation despite
the trial court's determination that benefits should be reduced from the maximum
weekly payment to ninety-nine percent of plaintiff's original award, on the
rationale that plaintiff's counsel had substantially preserved his client's entitlement to such benefits.2 5
P. Recovery of Past Medical Expenses
Many workers' compensation claims are litigated because the employer refuses
to pay benefits or medical bills at the outset, questions the need for medical
treatment sought or obtained by the employee, or refuses to pay for unauthorized
treatment previously undertaken. A claimant seeking recovery at trial for payment
of such past medical expenses must demonstrate that the treatment in question
was reasonably necessary, was related to his compensable injury, and that the
charges incurred for the treatment were reasonable.
The plaintiff in Hernandez v. Mead Foods, Inc.2' appealed the trial court's
refusal to charge the employer with payment of his past medical bills. The court
held that the plaintiff's failure to obtain an award of compensation benefits did
not necessarily preclude him from obtaining payment of the past medical bills.2 7
The court, however, denied the claim because the employee failed to establish
at trial that the medical treatment was for a work-related injury.20 8
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

105 N.M. 2, 727 P.2d 941 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 104 N.M. 702, 726 P.2d 856 (1986).
Id. at 3-4, 727 P.2d 942-43.
Id.
104 N.M. 769, 727 P.2d 77 (Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 773, 727 P.2d at 81.
Id. at 773-75, 727 P.2d at 81-83.
104 N.M. 731, 726 P.2d 885 (Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 737-38, 726 P.2d at 891-92.
Id. at 735-37, 726 P.2d at 889-91.
104 N.M. 67, 716 P.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 72-73, 716 P.2d at 650-51.
Id.

Winter 1988]

WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW

Pritchardv. Halliburton Servs. 209 considered the trial court's determination
that the plaintiff's own testimony concerning additional medical treatment he
underwent since the beginning of the trial was sufficient to establish the reasonableness and necessity of the treatment. 21 0 At the beginning of the trial the plaintiff
had demonstrated the necessity of the medical expenses he had incurred to that
date; at the continuation of the trial the plaintiff's testimony was intended to
update those expenses. 2 ' The appellate court held that the bills for the supplemental treatment would have to be offered into evidence for plaintiff to meet his
that the bills were for care plaintiff had already shown
burden of demonstrating
22
was necessary.
CONCLUSION
This survey has covered cases decided for a period immediately preceding the
enactment of new legislation which profoundly affects the law of workers' compensation in New Mexico. A number of cases decided during that time reaffirmed
and elaborated upon longstanding principles and policies which continue to
govern this area of law. Other decisions marked significant departures from prior
case law, many of which can be expected to survive, or even be "legislated
into" subsequent amendments to the new statute. In any event, traditional notions
of consistency, coupled with the ultimate goal of any workers' compensation
scheme to provide at least some economic support for the injured laborer and
his family, will likely result in reference to and reliance upon many of the
decisions discussed in this article for many years to come.

209. 104 N.M. 102, 717 P.2d 78 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 103 N.M. 798, 715 P.2d 71 (1986).
210. Id. at 106-07, 717 P.2d at 82-83. The trial continued from August 21, 1984 to December II, 1984.
Id. at 106, 717 P.2d at 82.
211. Id. at 106-07, 717 P.2d at 82-83.
212. Id. at 107, 717 P.2d at 83.

